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Abstract
Vertical mergers have become an important business strategy among food manufacturers because it
allows them to manage and customize their production according to consumer needs.  Economic theories have
shown that vertical mergers may be induced by transaction costs, demand variability, and other factors.  Using an
input-output methodology, a measure of vertical merger is developed for U.S. food manufacturing industries and
the transaction cost hypotheses tested in an attempt to examine the factors that motivate vertical mergers in the
food manufacturing industries.  The results are consistent with previous studies that confirm the role of
transaction cost factors, such as lock-in effects in terms of asset specificity and managerial diseconomies.
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What Determines Vertical Mergers in U.S. Food Manufacturing Industries?  
Introduction
As the U.S. food system becomes more and more consumer driven, vertical coordination, either through 
ownership integration (mergers) or through contracts, as a business strategy has become increasingly important
because it allows both farmers and food manufacturers to manage and customize their production according to
market needs.  It is believed that vertical coordination has resulted in improved, consistently higher quality, more
uniform food products and more choices of food products for consumers.  There are many studies that examine
vertical coordination in the U.S. food industries since early the 1960s, starting with that of Mighell and Jones
(1963).  Most of these studies focus on the vertical relationship between the value-added food industries (i.e.,
food manufacturers) and the upstream production agriculture (i.e., farmers), e.g., Marion (1986), Frank and
Henderson (1992), Barkema (1994), O’Brian (1994), among others.  Past studies have shown that among the
food industries the poultry industry has been vertically integrated since the early 1960s, while vertical
coordination has been spreading rapidly since early 1980s into other food industries.  For example, the percent of
total production under ownership integration and contracts during early 1990s in the poultry industry was 100%,
in the processed vegetables industry it was 98%, in the processed milk industry it was 26%, in the meat packing
industry it was 16%, and in the hog industries it was 21% (O’Brian, Perry et al., 1996) and the trend is
continuing.  The estimates provided by the existing studies are very similar and the general finding is that spot
market transactions have been gradually replaced, mostly by contracts vis-à-vis vertical ownership integration.  
Most of the reasons that firms choose to vertically integrate have to do with reducing costs or eliminating
externalities that are associated with buying from or selling to other firms (Carlton and Perloff, Chapter 12,
1999).
1   Economic theories have shown that vertical integration may be induced by transaction costs, market
imperfections, and other factors.
2  One of the most important reasons why firms integrate has to do with
transaction costs, such as the expenses associated with writing and enforcing contracts (Williamson, 1974, 1975,
1986; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978).  The more complicated a contract is, the higher the transaction cost
of enforcing and monitoring such a contract.  Thus, the inducement for vertical merger rises as the transaction
cost of using the marketplace rise.  
To our knowledge, no study other than Frank and Henderson quantitatively addresses the issue of
economic factors that drive vertical coordination in the U.S. food manufacturing industries.  For instance, some
of the existing studies on vertical coordination in the U.S. food industries focus on the process and implications of
such integration in a particular industry, such as pork, beef or broiler (e.g., Kliebenstein and Lawrence, 1995;
Rhodes, 1995; Martinez, 1999; Ward, 1997).  Others have focused on an explanation of vertical organization in
the food industries (e.g., Boehlje and Schrader, 1998; Cotterill, 2001) or on efficiencies of alternative vertical
mechanisms or the impact of vertical integration on market performance (e.g., Kinnucan and Nelson, 1993;
Azzam, 1996; Bhuyan, 2002).  Among the few studies that focus some of their attention on the motives behind
vertical coordination in the U.S. food industries, Mighel and Jones and Marion qualitatively examine vertical
coordination in the U.S. food industries and casually link transaction costs to vertical coordination (Frank and
Henderson, p. 941).  Frank and Henderson, on the other hand, empirically examined the effects of transaction
cost factors on backward or upstream vertical coordination and found a positive relationship between transaction
costs and vertical coordination via contracts.  Empirical studies focusing on non-food sectors also report
transaction cost linkages to vertical coordination (ownership or contracts), e.g., Levy (1985), Martin (1986),
Caves and Bradburd (1988), and Lieberman (1991).  
Although relatively narrower in scope, this study could be considered complementary to Frank and
Henderson’s study.  Like their study, we use an input-output methodology to construct an index of vertical
mergers for the U.S. food manufacturing industries and use econometric analysis to test hypotheses regarding
transaction cost motives behind vertical mergers.  However, unlike Frank and Henderson’s study, which
addresses the upstream or backward vertical ties, this study addresses the downstream or forward vertical ties of
U.S. food manufacturers to their final product markets in terms of forward vertical mergers (from here, the terms-2-
“vertical mergers” and “forward vertical mergers” are used interchangeably).  The general objective of this study
is to examine the factors affecting vertical mergers in the U.S. food manufacturing sector.  The study has two
specific objectives: (1) to construct an index of vertical mergers for U.S. food manufacturing industries, and (2)
to test the transaction cost motives for vertical mergers in these food industries.  The rest of the paper is
organized as follows: the index of vertical mergers and the testable hypotheses are presented in the next section
followed by an explanation of the data and estimation procedures used in this study.  Empirical results are
presented thereafter, followed by concluding comments.
Framework for Analysis
The analytical framework is divided into two parts: (1) we present the methodology behind the
measurement of the vertical merger index, and (2) we present an economic model to test the hypotheses for
transaction cost motives for vertical mergers in the U.S. food manufacturing industries.  This framework is very
similar to the one followed by Frank and Henderson.
Measurement of Vertical Merger Index: A Working Definition
Difficulty in measuring the degree of vertical ownership integration is well known (Hay and Morris,
1991, p. 345; Caves and Bradburd, p. 265).   Such measuring difficulties obviously pose serious problems in
attempts to analyze the impact of vertical ownership integration in the U.S. food manufacturing industries. 
Adelman’s (1955) value added-to-sales ratio is considered the seminal work on the empirical measurement of
vertical ownership integration.  More recent attempts at measuring vertical integration rely on the national input-
output (I-O) tables, a trend started by Maddigan (1981) with her “vertical industry connection index” for a given
firm.  Maddigan’s index was based on the extent of technological relatedness, as revealed by I-O tables, among
the set of industries within which the firm operates.  That is, Maddigan’s index specified industries within which
a firm operates and incorporated vertical interdepdencies revealed by I-O tables.  Her index captured all
backward and forward linkages that a firm had in the production-distribution chain. 
Improving on the Maddigan index of vertical connection, Frank and Henderson developed a vertical
coordination index to analyze various forms of vertical ties, such as spot market transactions, supply contracts,
and ownership integration that existed in the U.S. food manufacturing sector.  This vertical coordination index
represented the degree of backward vertical coordination that existed between U.S. food manufacturers (e.g.,
cheese manufacturers) and the suppliers of raw agricultural produce (e.g., dairy farmers).  Frank and
Henderson’s vertical coordination index ranged from zero for spot markets to one hundred percent for complete
backward vertical ownership integration.  Using 1982 input-output data at the four-digit SIC (standard industrial
classification) level, they found that the average vertical coordination index for food manufacturing industries
was 0.47, i.e., on average the degree of backward vertical coordination between U.S. farms and food
manufacturers was almost at the mid-point on a scale with fully independent farms on one end and fully
integrated farms (with food manufacturers) on the other end. 
The vertical merger index proposed in this study is based on the simple notion that vertical integration is
revealed by larger internal flows of output (i.e., output flows that take place within a firm’s different plants in
successive stages of production and distribution) as a substitute for market transactions.  Therefore, intra-firm
integration is incorporated in the measurement of vertical mergers.  MacDonald (1985) was the first to measure
intra-firm linkages as the proportions of shipments from an industry that are made to (or bought from) affiliated
units in another industry at a success stage in the production and distribution chain.  For instance, in the case of
downstream or forward successive stages, such affiliated units may include input and output producing plants,
sales offices, wholesale, and retail establishments (and would include input suppliers in the case of upstream or
backward successive stages). 
The essence of vertical integration is the decision by the individual firm to organize exchanges internally
(within the firm) or externally (in the marketplace).  However, because it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain
information on the internal and market exchange of individual firms (Perry, 1989), we present a theoretically
cruder, but more practical, working definition of a vertical merger index for an industry.  This working definition-3-
(1)
is based on models presented by both Caves and Bradburd, and Davies and Morris (1995).  It also takes both
intra-firm and inter-industry flows into consideration which can be explained as follows: suppose that firm  ’s
plants in industry   sells a product worth $100 to industry  , while its plants in industry   purchase $80 of
product from its own plants in industry  .  Thus, while the inter-industry flow is $100, the intra-firm flow is $80. 
Using the national I-O tables and other related data (see explanation later), we construct an index of
forward vertical ownership integration where a food manufacturing firm    in industry   owns plants or firms in
another industry   ( ), where   may include wholesaler, retailers, or other downstream food manufacturers. 
Such measurement reflects ownership integration between both business units in a given industry and those in
industries downstream from it, thereby offering the potential for testing the transaction cost hypotheses on such
vertical relationships.  Note that such a measurement will miss any integrated enterprises that operate in vertically-
related industries but do not actually transfer intermediate products between their units (Caves and Bradburd). 
Then, in an economy comprised of    firms and   industries, the extent of forward vertical merger in
industry   is measured by the proportion of industry sales accounted for by the intra-firm flows of output from
firms in that industry to their plants in other industries downstream, i.e.,  
where   is the index of forward vertical merger of industry  ,    is  th firm’s intra-firm flows between
industry  and downstream industry   , and   is the total sales of industry  .  If there are no intra-firm flows
between industry   and    , then   indicating the lack of a measurable level of vertical ownership
integration (given data and methodological constraints).  Similarly, if industry   is fully integrated to downstream
industry  , then  .  Thus, the value of the forward vertical merger integration will lie between 0 and 1 or
.   Some of the features of this vertical ownership integration index are as follows: (a) it is based on
the explicit notion of what constitutes vertical ownership integration and measures intra-firm and inter- industry
integration, (b) this index can be computed using public domain data and does not require any subjective
assessment of firm or industry definition, and (c) this index can be calculated at either the firm or the industry level
or both (however, as Perry noted, it almost impossible to find firm level data, and not surprisingly we use industry
level data in this study). 
Equation 1 can be explained using input-output and revenue data of firms in the meat packing industry
(SIC 2011).  According to the 1992 Census of Manufacturers and 1992 Benchmark Input-output Accounts data
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 1997 and 1998), shipments from companies in the meat packing industry to
establishments owned by the same company in other sectors included $4,132.93 million or 8.19% of total revenue
to downstream wholesale establishments (ws), i.e.,  , $193 million or 0.38% to
owned retail stores and outlets, $1883.42 million or 3.73% to other owned manufacturing establishments, and
$151.15 million or 0.30% to other owned nonmanufacturing establishments.  Thus, the forward vertical merger
index in the meat packing industry is    Similar computations were carried out for other
food manufacturing industries and the results are reported in the “Empirical Results” section.  Note that the
vertical merger index,  , does not reveal which party initiated the merger.
Determinants of Vertical Mergers
In the transaction cost theories of Williamson, and Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, vertical integration is
induced by the problems of small-numbers bargaining and asset specificity.  Such problems can arise either due to
small number of firms in the market, ex ante, or due to transaction specific assets and switching costs that create
lock-in problems, ex post.  In the former case, fewness of buyers and sellers should positively predict vertical
integration as firms may utilize ownership integration to reduce the potential opportunistic behavior when few
firms bargain (Caves and Bradburd).  In the latter case, each party to the transaction has the potential to-4-
expropriate quasi-rents derived from the other firm’s investment and if long-term contracts can not be written to
avoid potential hold-up problems, firms must resort to integration (Lieberman).  
The evidence to support the hypothesis that vertical integration rises with supplying industry market
concentration, representing fewness of sellers, has been obtained in various prior studies (e.g., Caves and
Bradburd, MacDonald, Levy, and Martin).  In terms of food industries, Frank and Henderson find supporting
evidence for backward vertical integration in the U.S. food manufacturing industries.  Such findings are consistent
with the argument that the small-numbers bargaining problem induces vertical integration and we hypothesize as
such.  We also hypothesize that forward vertical merger is more likely when the upstream industry must commit to
large sunk investments in assets.  In this regard, the importance of investment in specific human capital as an
incentive to integrate vertically was emphasized by both Masten, Meehan, and Snyder (1989) and Caves and
Bradburd.  For example, Caves and Bradburd found that vertical integration rises with spending on research and
development, which was used as a measure of investment in highly specific human capital.  Frank and
Henderson’s study arrives at a similar conclusion.
Regarding testing the transaction cost motives for vertical mergers in the U.S. food manufacturing
industries, we use the four firm concentration ratio ( ) to capture the fewness of sellers because it is the most
accepted and traditional measure of market concentration (Rogers, 2001).  To capture the lock-in problem in terms
of asset specificity in these industries, we consider the capital that is potentially sunk and specific to an industry. 
Following previous studies, such as Caves and Bradburd, we use the food manufacturing industry’s assets-to-
employee ratio ( ) and research and development expenditures-to-sales ratio ( ) to capture such lock-
in effects.  Frank and Henderson, for instance, call such variables “idiosyncratic investments” that capture
differential characteristics and asset specificity of a cross-section of food manufacturing industries.  Higher asset
specificity would increase the lock-in effect and would provide incentive for vertical mergers in the food industries. 
Williamson (1974, pp. 1443-1456) points to diseconomies of scale as a factor limiting the extent of
vertical integration.  This is because the same transactional inefficiency factors promoting vertical coordination
also limit the extent of internalization (Frank and Henderson, p. 947).  Both Martin and Scherer and Ross (1990)
note possible unfavorable impacts of such diseconomies on vertical mergers.  Following the literature, we employ
two variables to capture such diseconomies of scale in the U.S. food manufacturing industries: (1) average firm
size ( ), measured in millions of dollars per firm in an industry; and (2) operational diseconomies
( ), measured as the average number of plants per firm in an industry.  The first variable was used to
capture the potential loss of managerial control, ceteris paribus, in large firms.  The second variable is based on
the ground that the cost of handling transactions within a firm should be greater, ceteris paribus, the larger the
number of plants per firm.  Thus, the predicted effect of these two variables based on transaction cost theory on
vertical mergers in the food manufacturing industries is negative.
According to Lieberman, although demand fluctuations alone are not sufficient to induce vertical
integration, several studies have shown that vertical integration can be induced by fluctuations in demand.  For
example, Carlton (1979) has proposed that firms integrate (or may rely on nonmarket coordination methods) to
minimize the total costs attributable to demand fluctuations.  Uncertain demand (or supply) makes it very costly or
impossible for firms to anticipate all contingencies and induce firms to rely more on nonmarket coordinating
methods, including vertical mergers (Frank and Henderson, p. 946).  To measure the fluctuation of downstream
demand for food manufacturers’ output, we use the percentage of change in food manufacturers’ output between
1987 and 1992 ( ).  We hypothesize that food manufacturers are motivated to use vertical merger as a
business strategy to rectify demand uncertainty in their output markets.  
Finally, like many of its predecessors, this is an industry-level study (mainly due to data limitations) and
therefore, likely to have some integration and aggregation bias.  Following Davies and Morris, we hypothesize that
such aggregation bias would have negative regression coefficients.  To correct for such potential bias, we use two
control variables: (1) the number of five digit industries ( ) covered by each food manufacturing industry
under study; (2) the proportion of total industry sales accounted for by sales within the industry ( ), e.g., the
value of shipment in the meat packing industry (SIC 2011) that is accounted for by SIC 2011, as recorded in the-5-
input-output tables.
Data and Estimation Procedure
The focus of this study is on the U.S. food manufacturing industries at the Census four-digit industry
group or SIC level.
3   There were 49 food manufacturing industries at the four-digit SIC level in 1992, the year for
which all the necessary data for this study were publicly available (the data are available upon request).
4   Census
data on vertical ownership was not available for six industries and it prevented us from constructing the 
index for those six industries: SICs 2043, 2062, 2068, 2076, 2085, and 2097.  These six food manufacturing
industries were dropped from this study and the remaining 43 are used in this study. 
As explained earlier in the construction of the   index using Equation 1, the 1992 Census of
Manufacturer data on  “Distribution of Sales by Class of Customer” and 1992 Benchmark Input-output Accounts
data were used to construct the forward vertical merger index.   The 1992 Census of Manufacturers is also used
as the source for the following variables: average firm size ( ), operational diseconomies ( ) – 
variables to control for integration and aggregation bias (  and  ), assets-to-employee ratio
( ), and demand fluctuation ( ).  Data on capital assets, used to construct the assets-to-
employee ratio, were kindly provided by Professor Richard T. Rogers of the University of Massachusetts.  Finally,
data on   were obtained from Bhuyan and Lopez (1998). 
Because the dependent variable   is bounded between 0 and 1, it was transformed into the log-odds or
logit functional form,  , for testing our hypotheses.  Preliminary screening showed evidence of
heteroskedasticity (chi-square test statistic=19.918 with 8 degrees of freedom).  White’s method was employed to
obtain heteroskedasticity consistent estimates of standard errors. 
A common criticism of the economic model presented here is that such models may have simultaneity bias
and/or endogeneity bias because some of the explanatory variables (e.g.,  and  ) may be partially
endogenous or simultaneously determined.  Results of the Hausman tests for simultaneity and endogeneity (see
Gujarati, p. 669-673, 1995 for details) rule out such bias.  For example, results of the simultaneity tests show that
residuals for both   and   were statistically not significant (absolute t-values for these two variables are
respectively 1.581 and 0.119 with 34 degrees of freedom), and results of the endogeneity test for these two
variables show that the computed chi-square statistic ( ) was statistically insignificant.  Summary
statistics and a correlation matrix for the variables used in this study are presented in Appendix tables 1 and 2,
respectively.  We test the hypotheses presented earlier using the SHAZAM computer program.
Empirical Results
This analysis examines the role of transaction cost factors on the extent of forward vertical mergers in the
U.S. food manufacturing industries.  Using an input-output methodology, an index of vertical mergers was
computed for 43 food manufacturing industries (Table 1) and that index was later used as the dependent variable
to econometrically test the transaction cost hypotheses discussed earlier.  Given a possible maximum of 1.00 for
the forward vertical merger index (or 100 percent ownership of a downstream stage in a vertical production-
distribution chain by its upstream firms), results in Table 1 show that the degree of forward vertical ownership
integration in U.S. food manufacturing industries was about 12%, which is quite low.
[Table 1 about here]
Table 1 shows that the forward vertical merger index value ranged from 0.010 in the wet corn milling
industry (SIC 2046) to 0.3355 in the soft drinks industry (SIC 2086).  This means that firms in the soft drinks
industry owned over 33% of their downstream markets (e.g., Coca Cola owning its own bottling plants) and firms
in the wet corn milling industries owned about 1.0% of their downstream markets.  Some of the industries that
show a larger downstream ownership include the bread and bakeries industry (SIC 2051; perhaps due to a large
number of bakeries selling their products in their own stores), dairy industries (e.g., SIC 202), and sausages and-6-
other prepared meats industry (SIC 2013).  Given that Frank and Henderson’s study shows a backward (or
upstream) vertical coordination index of 0.47, the results of this study imply that the extent of backward vertical
coordination (including mergers, contract, and other forms of vertical coordination) is higher than the extent of
forward vertical mergers in the U.S. food manufacturing sector.  Such findings support a common belief among
agricultural economists that backward vertical ties in the U.S. food production-distribution chain are higher than
the forward ties.
The results of the economic model used to test the transaction cost hypotheses are presented in Table 2. 
The results provide partial support for the transaction cost hypotheses because while the small-numbers bargaining
hypothesis was rejected it was also found that the lock-in effects do significantly impact forward vertical mergers
in the U.S. food manufacturing industries.  All three variables (RND, EMPASS, and AVFMSZ) used to represent
lock-in effects in terms of asset specificity and diseconomies of scale appear with their respective expected signs
and were statistically significant.  The results thus show that while higher asset specificity provides incentive for
vertical merger, such inducement is also negated by strong diseconomies of scale.  Several prior studies cited
earlier have found similar evidence, including Frank and Henderson’s.
The significant negative influence of CR4, used to capture the fewness of sellers, runs counter to the a
priori reasoning presented earlier, and to the results of Caves and Bradburd and MacDonald.  This outcome
strongly rejects the small-numbers hypothesis which predicts a tendency for firms to vertically merge when there
are few sellers (or buyers).  One explanation is that the sample and study period used in this study simply do not
support the small-numbers hypothesis.  This would imply that fewness of sellers in the U.S. food manufacturing
industries do not trigger vertical mergers, and firms in the successive stages of food manufacturing and firms
downstream (i.e., wholesalers and retailers) were able to overcome the potential adverse effects of the transaction
costs associated with the fewness of sellers.  Part of the answer to the unexpected sign of CR4 may also lie with
the nature of the concentration data which is aggregated at the four-digit SIC level and may have an inherent
downward bias.  This reasoning is similar to that of Davies and Morris who also observed a negative and
significant impact of market concentration on vertical mergers.  Another possible explanation is that the sample
does not contain a sufficient number of observations to support the null hypothesis (i.e., fewness of sellers would
increase vertical merger) for the food manufacturing industries.  Use of the Herfindhal-Hirschman index (HHI) of
industry concentration instead of CR4 did not fundamentally alter our results presented in Table 2.
The demand fluctuation variable (DEMFLUC) used to test the demand variability/uncertainty hypothesis
appear with an unexpected positive sign but it was statistically insignificant.  Again, this unexpected sign and
statistical insignificance may be due to the insufficient number of observations or lack of data that truly represents
demand uncertainty for food manufacturers’ output.  Results in Table 2 also show that although aggregation and
integration bias exist in the computed forward vertical merger index (because both 5DIGIT and INTRA are
negative and statistically significant), the results of the transaction cost hypotheses are quite robust.  The beta
coefficients
 5 (Table 2) show that the three most important variables in explaining forward vertical mergers in the
U.S. food manufacturing sector were transaction cost factors: average firm size (AVFMSZ), fewness of sellers
(CR4), and asset-to-employee ratio (EMPASS).  The overall fit of the model was good given that this is a cross-
sectional analysis (pseudo R
2 = 0.47).  
Conclusions
Testing hypotheses about vertical mergers on cross-sections of industries “is attractive for the variance it
supplies in the structural determinants, and for the chance to observe entities in presumed long-run equilibrium”
(Caves and Bradburd, P. 265).  Additionally, such a vertical merger measure is appropriate for use in cross-
sectional analysis because it focuses on inter-industry and intra-industry transactions and mergers (Frank and
Henderson, p.950).  We construct a measure of forward vertical ownership integration using an input-output
methodology that takes intra-firm and inter-industry transactions into account.  This measure was used to compute
the extent of forward vertical mergers between U.S. food manufacturers and their downstream industries, such as
retail and wholesale.  Unlike the backward vertical relationship between the U.S. food manufacturers and farmers,-7-
the extent of forward vertical mergers in the food manufacturing industries was quite low.  Using the index of
vertical mergers constructed, we test several hypotheses that propose that transaction cost driven factors are the
primary determinants of forward vertical mergers in the food manufacturing industries.  The results of this study
indicate that transaction costs can create motivation for forward vertical mergers, however, the small-numbers,
i.e., fewness of sellers, hypothesis was rejected.  The results show that firms integrate to avoid bargaining
problems arising from ex post lock-in.  The most important factors that provide inducement for vertical mergers
are related to asset specificity and scale economies.  These findings are consistent with prior empirical studies.  
Although somewhat limited in scope compared to Frank and Henderson’s study, this study of forward
vertical integration complements their study of backward vertical coordination in the U.S. food manufacturing
industries.  While the results of this study are generally consistent with the existing empirical literature on
transaction cost models, several caveats apply.  Two of the hypotheses, i.e., small-numbers and demand
variability, implied by the transaction cost literature did not receive empirical support.  This is probably due to
data limitations; however, this study suffers from the same data inconvenience faced by previous studies cited
earlier.  Thus, the explanatory variables are imperfect measures and may have biased the results.  Although the
results accord reasonably well with the existing empirical literature, it is also possible that the findings are specific
to the food manufacturing industries and care should be taken in generalizing the results.  
Endnotes
1. The focus of this study is on vertical ownership integration, or vertical mergers, which is the more traditional
view, as in Carlton and Perloff, Chapter 12.  The terms “vertical integration” and “vertical mergers” are used
here interchangeably.  Additionally, as the analytical framework would show, the focus here is only on the
downstream or forward vertical merger in the U.S. food manufacturing industries.  For an analysis of the
upstream or backward vertical relationships (via ownership or otherwise) between food manufacturers and
their raw material suppliers or farmers, see Frank and Henderson (1992).
2. See Perry (1989) for an excellent review of the vertical integration literature.
3. The specific reasons for using industry-level data instead of firm-level data are as follows: (1) as Perry and
others noted, it is practically impossible to obtain the necessary information on the internal and market
exchange of individual firms, (2) the index of vertical ownership integration presented in Equation 1 can be
applied at both firm and industry levels, and (3) all the necessary data required to implement Equation 1 and
model 4 are publicly available at the four-digit SIC level only.  Data availability, therefore, forced this and
many other empirical studies (e.g., Frank and Henderson) to focus at the four-digit SIC level.  
4. The national account input-output data which were used to construct the index of forward vertical merger
(Equation 1) are published only every 10 years at the somewhat aggregated industry (equivalent to the 4-digit
SIC) level.  As cited earlier, the latest national input-output accounts data available is for 1992 only. 
Additionally, although some of the latest Economic Census data were available for 1997, the bridge between
SIC and NAICS (North American Industrial Classification System which replaced the SIC system effective
1997), has not been completed at the time of this report.  
5. Beta coefficients show which variables contribute most to the regression by taking into account the effect of a
typical or "equally likely" change in variables.  The beta coefficients were calculated by multiplying the
estimated coefficients by the standard deviation of each regressor and dividing by the standard deviation of the
dependent variable. 
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Table 1.  Degree of Vertical Mergers in the U.S. Food Manufacturing Industries, 1992
 SIC Code Industry description Forward Vertical
Integration Index (FVI)
2011 Meat packing plants 0.1261
2013 Sausages and other prepared meats 0.2710
2015 Poultry slaughtering and processing 0.1623
2021 Creamery butter  0.2909
2022 Cheese, natural and processed 0.0584
2023 Dry, condensed, and evaporated dairy products 0.0511
2024 Ice cream and frozen desserts 0.2805
2026 Fluid milk 0.2697
2032 Canned Specialty 0.0546
2033 Canned fruits and Vegetables 0.0793
2034 Dehydrated Fruits, vegetables and soups 0.1846
2035 Pickles, sauces and salad dressing 0.0446
2037 Frozen fruits and vegetables 0.0541
2038 Frozen specialties, n.e.c. 0.0997
2041 Flour and other grain mill products 0.0210
2044 Rice milling 0.0505
2045 Prepared flour mixes and doughs 0.0269
2046 Wet corn milling 0.0100
2047 Dog and cat food 0.0516
2048 Prepared feeds, n.e.c. 0.2162
2051 Bread, cake, and related products 0.3275
2052 Cookies and crackers 0.0259
2053 Frozen bakery products, except bread 0.1269
2061 Raw cane sugar 0.0603
2063 Beet sugar 0.0954
2064 Candy and other confectionary products 0.0660
2066 Chocolate and cocoa products 0.0832
2067 Chewing gum 0.0765
2074 Cottonseed oil mills 0.0437
2075 Soybean oil mills 0.1399
2077 Animal and marine fats and oils 0.0792
2079 Edible fats and oils, n.e.c. 0.1564
2082 Malt beverages 0.0236
2083 Malt 0.0467
2084 Wines, brandy, and brandy spirits 0.0876
2086 Bottled and canned soft drinks 0.3355
2087 Flavoring extracts and syrups, n.e.c. 0.1866
2091 Canned and cured fish and seafoods 0.2112
2092 Fresh or frozen prepared fish 0.0797-11-
2095 Roasted coffee 0.1652
2096 Potato chips and similar snacks 0.1370
2098 Macaroni and spaghetti 0.0866





Note: n.e.c. = not elsewhere classified.-12-
  
Table 2: Determinants of Vertical Mergers in U.S. Food Manufacturing Industries (N=43)
Dependent variable: forward vertical mergers (FVI)  a
Variable Name Expected sign Estimated
Coefficient 
Beta Coefficient b




Research & Development Index (RND) positive 0.9906 ***
(0.0737)
2.028
Assets-Employee Ratio (EMPASS) positive 0.00047 ***
(0.71E-04)
2.988
Average firm size (AVFMSZ) negative - 0.02669 ***
(0.77E-03)
7.841
Operational Diseconomies (OPRDIS) negative - 0.08899 **
(0.0361)
0.451
Demand Fluctuations (DEMFLUC) negative 0.000025
(0.16E-04)
2.567
Integration and Aggregation bias1
(5DIGIT)
negative - 0.05523 ***
(0.0035)
1.684
Integration and Aggregation bias2
(INTRA)
negative - 1832.10 ***
(191.90)
4.100
Constant  - 1.1676
(0.0544)
 between observed and predicted 0.4723
Notes:(i) a= logit transformed vertical merger index, b= beta coefficients are in absolute terms, and c=
heteroscadasticity-consistent estimates of standard errors (obtained using White’s procedures) are in
parenthesis, (ii) *** = significant at  99% level, ** = significant at 95% level.-13-
       Appendix table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Regression Analysis
NAME  N MEAN ST. DEV. MINIMUM MAXIMUM
FVI      43 0.121 0.0893 0.0100 0.3355
CR4 43 47.953 17.934 19.000 90.000
RND     43 0.314 0.183 0.0001 0.728
EMPASS     43 213.74 567.66 15.286 3786.70
AVFMSZ      43 27.659 26.226 5.245 138.14
OPRDIS     43 1.411 0.452 0.903 3.077
DEMFLUC  43 9033.7 9168.2 602.00 48923.00
5DIGIT 43 4.256 2.735 1.000 12.000
INTRA 43 0.745E-04 0.154E-03 0.000 0.923E-03
      Appendix table 2: Correlation Matrix of Variables Used in Regression Analysis (N=43)
FVI      1.000
CR4 -0.405 1.000
RND -0.147 0.307 1.000
EMPAS -0.177 0.154 0.075 1.000
AVFMS -0.196 0.254 0.208 0.105 1.000
OPRDIS -0.255 0.094 -0.033 0.136 0.395 1.000
DEMFL 0.310 -0.266 -0.199 -0.173 0.127 -0.145 1.000
5DIGIT 0.146 -0.336 -0.039 -0.158 -0.046 -0.091 0.659 1.000
INTRA -0.186 0.130 -0.082 0.487 -0.007 0.355 -0.204 -0.155 1.000
FVI CR4 RND EMPAS AVFMSZ OPRDIS DEMFLUC 5DIGIT INTRA